The applicability of Heidegger’s phenomenology in the study of Islam

Fariborz Moharram-khani

Received: 2015/1/20          Accepted: 2016/4/1

Abstract
It is clear that every interpreter brings with him certain conceptions, in most cases unconsciously. But then question arises, which conceptions are right and adequate? Heidegger’s philosophy is concern with preparing the ground for understanding the meaning of The Being by carrying out a subtle and revolutionary phenomenology of the human mode of existence. Since in the Qur’an, too human existence is the object of attention, it should be possible to show that there is some affinity between the idea of human being made explicit by Heidegger’s phenomenology and the idea of human being that is implicit in the Qur’an. To confirm this, the present paper compares the structure which make possible to be human in Qur’an, and in Heidegger’s existentialism.

As a result of this inquiry, there is a certain kinship between the Qur’an, and phenomenological approaches to human being, and that based on these similarities there would be two results. First, phenomenology is applicable in Islamic studies. Second, this method will provide us to learn from the Qur’an, what we need for our present life.

Keywords: Heidegger; phenomenology; Islam; Human being.

1. Assistant Professor of Political Thought Faculty of Social Science, Payam Noor university, Iran
1. The starting point.

German discussions about cultural despair were heightened by defeat in World War 1, which further ended the leading status of the Liberal-progressive view of history propounded by the influential neo-kantian thinkers. Affirming Germany’s appropriation of enlightenment as well as cultural, political and scientific values, neo-kantians interpreted history as the gradual development both of more effective ways of controlling nature and of more enlightened modes of social organization and cultural self-expression. Opposed to the progressive view of history were two groups: 1) those who believed that history had no direction; and 2) those who believed that history involved a decline from great beginnings. Heidegger’s approach to history has affinities with the view that western history involves decline from noble origins (Zimmerman, 2001: 193).

Heidegger believes that western history has become increasingly governed by the technology (Die Technik) which is the outcome of metaphysics (Heidegger, 2002: 67). The technological culture is for Heidegger the decisive environment of humans in the late modern era. He did not think of technology as the use of tools, he instead used technology in the sense of modern technology and meant the essence of technology (Bergman, 2005: 420). Needless to say, Heidegger’s search for the essence of technology is not what is called and criticized as essentialism these days. For Heidegger technology is a particular kind of thinking that concern itself with the practical application of the theoretical science for the purpose of dominating and exploiting nature (Heidegger, 1991: 6). Modern technology challenges nature to yield its treasures to humans. Next, technology positions and orders the yields of nature so that they are available and disposable to humans. Whatever is so positioned and ordered becomes a resource. In fact, it is not technology which has produced the problems of modern civilization rather it is modern civilization which has created for itself the problem of an uncontrolled technology (Brunner, 1947: 73). Modern man always makes use of technical means which are the result of science. In case of illness, modern man has recourse to physician, to medical science. In the case of economic and political affairs, he makes use of the result of psychological, social, economic, and political science, and so on. Nobody reckons with direct intervention of God. The experience of the flight of the Gods is relevant for modern world (Heidegger, 1962: 47). The thinking of modern man is really shaped by the scientific world-view, and that modern man needs it for their daily lives. The scientific world-view engenders a great temptation, namely, that man strives for mastery over the world and over his own life. He knows the laws of nature and can use the power of nature according to his plans and desires. Finally, Heidegger gathers this entire way of treating and disclosing nature under the title of the framework (das Gestell) -the essence of technology. This concept of technology led to the contemporary view that in order for
something ‘to be’, it must be present as raw material for enhancing the power of the technological system. Heidegger believes Productionist metaphysics is not only a mode of comportment which emphasizes instrumentality in our dealings with nature and thereby fails to fathom its origin. Indeed, it is also a misguided form of praxis which homogenizes all manners of appearing and disposes being for consumption as “standing reserve” (Heidegger, 1997: 17).

In this circumstance man finds himself cut off from the world, unsure of its existence and left with the un-consoling presence of a methodological doubt. With Certainty and security only within himself he turns naturally to a technological approach. Here he attempts to have manipulative control over all the objects in his world, determining from within himself what place and meaning these objects will have in his life. Such an approach alienates man from the world and others. This alienation is something that is embodied in modern man’s existence. At the basis of this technological approach lies a basic mood of suspicion and fear. There is a vague uncertainty about the world in which man finds himself. Man manipulates this world and brings it under his control and yet he never quite feels at home in it. He is unsure of its existence and nature and frequently discovers that this controlled world threatens him. According to Heidegger, it is an illusion to suppose that real security can be gained by men organizing their own personal and community life (Heidegger, 1966: 91).

By means of science men try to take possession of the world, but instead the world gets possession of men. We can see in our time to what degree men are dependent on technology, and to what degree technology brings with it terrible consequences. From the standpoint of Heidegger, the danger is not the destruction of nature or culture but the creation of totalizing kinds of practice. This threat is not a problem for which we must find a solution, but an ontological condition that requires a transformation of our understanding of being. He sees that it would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil (Heidegger, 1982: 53). According to him, this decline resulted from the gradual self-concealment of Being, a process that began with Plato and Aristotle and that was hastened by the translation of crucial Greek philosophical terms into Latin, such as the Latin ‘natura’ for ‘physics’. The end of this process is technological nihilism. Heidegger talks about west’s decline into technological nihilism, characterized by the darkening of the earth and the flight of Gods (Heidegger, 1962: 54). The main reason for this result is the development of science and technology which procures the illusion that man is master over the world and his life. Romantic Movement was formed in response to this result. Then there is the historical relativism which grew out of the Romantic Movement. It contends that our reason does not perceive eternal or absolute truth but is subject to historical development, and that every truth has only a relative validity for a given time,

... race or culture, and thus, in the end, the search for truth becomes meaningless. But for Heidegger the traditional definition of man as rational animal is tied to an understanding of subjectivity as representation and as foundation. It is what generates an anthropocentric metaphysics which has as its effect an objectifying mode of thought. The term ‘Dasein’ was introduced in order to discharge the prejudices inherent in such term as man or subjectivity (Mulhall, 2005: 297). He believes that Dasein could be saved from technological nihilism only by a world-founding renewal of Dasein’s relation to The Being (Heidegger, 1962: 88).

Heidegger introduces Phenomenology as the general prospect for engaging in philosophical inquiry, hinging on a fundamental enactment of Dasein’s being. Phenomenology is the method of ontology and thus ontology is possible only as phenomenology (Heidegger, 1962: 35). Heidegger maintains that ontology properly studies what it is for an entity to be as such. The task of ontology is to be the science of being (Heidegger1982: 17). For Heidegger phenomenology is an attitude or practice in seeing that takes its departure from lived experience. It aims at grasping the phenomena of lived involvement in the world, before our understanding of the world becomes determined and altered in thematic or reflective thought. The minimization of the role of the subject on the one hand, and the emphasis on the overwhelming occurrence of physics on the other, indicates a deeper origin for phenomenology as a practice which works in unison with the emergence of beings.

Accordingly, existentialism has appeared as a philosophical reaction against the scientific humanism that prevailed as a subsequence of modernism. On the face of it, this philosophy movement does seem to offer to the religious inquiries a way to access to the contemporary mind, since theology is the clarification of the content of faith, and the bringing of it to conscious knowledge (Bultmann, 1951: 187). There is an intrinsic relationship between theology and existentialism. That is to say, theology is a kind of phenomenology of faith. To explain in more detail, there are two main distinguish characteristics in Heideggerian philosophy which are useful for theological study; first, a manner of putting the question, which treats theological questions as primarily questions of man’s existence in relation to God, and interprets the sacred writings like the Qur’an which primarily concerns man’s existence.

Second, a system of basic concepts derived from the philosophy of existence, which claims to have analyzed in suitable concepts the understanding of existence which is given with existence (Maquarrie, 1973: 13). That is why some say of Heidegger that his philosophy takes shape as the historical quest for being, and is seen to be essentially religious(Blackham, 2002: 130). Therefore, the main question of this paper is whether Heidegger phenomenology is applicable to Islamic studies such as the conceptualization of human being in Qur’an?
2. Qur’an and Heidegger’s phenomenology

It is clear that every interpreter brings with him certain conceptions, perhaps idealistic or psychological, as presuppositions of his exegesis, in most cases unconsciously. But then the question arises, which conceptions are right and adequate? Which presuppositions are right and adequate? Needless to say, we cannot know in advance what the text will say; on the contrary, we must learn from it. It can be said that method is nothing other than a kind of questioning, a way of putting question.

As mentioned before, Heidegger’s philosophy takes shape as a historical quest for Being, most of his “Being and Time” is concerned with preparing the ground for understanding the meaning of Being by carrying out a subtle and revolutionary phenomenology of the human mode of existence. A phenomenological inquiry into The Being, then, will not look at the properties possessed by human, but rather at the structures which make it possible to be human.

In this paper, Qur’an is studied as the main text. The leading question is, how is man’s existence understood in the Qur’an? In respect of this question, phenomenology is shown to be an appropriate method that will provide us with a groundwork in the light of which we can gather together the isolated concepts of the Qur’an’s teachings and exhibit their structural relationships. So, if it is true that the right questions are concerned with the possibilities of understanding human existence, then it is necessary to discover the adequate conceptions by which such understanding is to be expressed.

Since in Heidegger’s existentialism, human existence is directly the object of attention, it is the proper philosophy for this study. What is most important about Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutic is his recognition of the significance of the finitude, worldliness and historicity of our human predicament and the recognition that our access to things is always colored and pre-shaped by the sense of things circulating in our historical culture (Dostal, 1993: 141). His writings uphold philosophy as a form of action rather than as a body of knowledge and there is a concerted effort to bring philosophy down to earth as an extension of fact life experience. In short, Heidegger’s phenomenology in Being and Time is especially concerned with analyzing the constitution of the being of man. Since the main theme of Qur’an is human existence “This is a Book which we have revealed to you that you may bring forth men, by their Lord permission from utter darkness into light ...” (‘Ebrāhīm: 1), so, the study of human being is common concern between these two.

If Heidegger’s phenomenology is to be helpful in this regard, it should be possible to show that there is some sympathy and affinity between the idea of human being made explicit by this approach and the idea of human being that is implicit in the Qur’an. If no such affinity can be shown, then indeed it might be justly said that phenomenological approach to Qur’an obscure and distorts
authentic Islamic teachings by compelling it to assume the forms of a way of thought which are quite foreign to it.

The present paper compares the structures which make possible to be human in Qurʾān and in Heidegger’s existentialism. Among them may be mentioned; definition of human being which is related to the meaning of World, Understanding, Fallenness, Guilt, and Death. These are prominent among the phenomena which a philosopher such as Heidegger considers to be constitutive structures of the being of man.

If this paper could show that there is a certain kinship or sympathy between the Qurʾānic and phenomenological approaches to human being, then based on these similarities there would be two results. First, phenomenology is applicable in Islamic studies. Second, this method will provide us to learn from the Qurʾān what we need for our present life.

**Human being:** It may first be asserted that, in the verses of Qurʾān about human being, man is not simply a part of nature. While both man and nature are the creation of God, and man in his existence is bound up with the world, the being of man, as made in the word of God, is conceived as quite distinct from the being of nature. "And we have certainly honored the children of Adam and carried them on the land and sea and provided them of the good things and preferred them over much of what we have created, with definite preference" (al-ʾEsrāʾ: 70). Or "and mention when we said to the angels” Prostrate before Adam ...” (Al-Baqara: 34).

The creator’s greatest gift to man necessarily places him, in analogy with God’s being, at a distance from nature. “Then He proportioned him and breathed into him from His (create) soul ... (As-sajda: 9), or “And, when your Lord said to the angels, Indeed, I will make upon the earth a successive authority ...” (Al-Baqara: 30).

This understanding of the human being is far removed from Greek attempts to determine and classify his place with the unity of the cosmos, for instance, as a rational animal. On the other hand, Man is confronted with possibility, and he is individually unique in his being, this concept of existence carries with it two implications which are important for our purpose. The first is that man is in a world (and carried them on the land and sea and provided them of the good things” (al-ʾEsrāʾ: 70). Heidegger is never tired of attacking the notion of a pure ego, or a bare subject. This fundamental character of existence Heidegger denotes by the expression being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962: 17). Being-in-the-world is a unity within which we may distinguish through analysis the self on the one hand and the world on the other, but from which we may not separate either of them. It means that man’s existence is always somatic. The body is constitutive of the being of man. “O, you who believed eat of the good things that we have provided you with, and give thanks to Allah if Him it is that you serve” (Al-Baqara: 172 or Al-Baqara: 29, and Al-jāthīya: 13). Even in the life to come, man
will still be a body. “When we have died and become dust and bones, are we indeed to be resurrected? And our forefathers, Say, yes, and you will be contemptible” (aš-ṣāffat: 16-17-18). What is important is that man is a unity, and the body is his characteristic way of being. The body according to phenomenological view is a way of being, not a substance or a thing. To be a body means that man does not exist as a bare discarnate ego. It is obviously out of not thinking of tissues of bone and muscle and so on, but of man’s way of being in a world where sin is possible. According to this approach, man has two fundamental possibilities; he can be at one with himself or he can be estranged from himself. The being of man as a soul imprisoned in an alien body is because he had become so acutely aware of the split within the self in a sinful existence that his thought assumes a dualistic form. This follows from what has been said about man having a relation himself. He may master himself or may lose himself and live at war with himself. When the body has fallen completely into sin it becomes “the body of death” from which man must be rescued. “...We could afflict them for their sin? But we seal over their hearts so they do not hear” (Al-‘A’rāf: 100). But this means deliverance from the evil possibilities of somatic existence and not from the body as such. “O men! There has come to you indeed an admonition from your Lord and a healing for what is in the breasts and a guidance and a mercy for the believers” (yūnus: 57). This is similar to Heidegger’s teaching that man is always being-in-the-world, that he exists in the sense of being related to himself, and that his existence can be authentic or inauthentic. The Qurān itself supports existential notion of body. “This is because they love this world’s life more than the hereafter, and because Allah does not guide the unbeliever people. These are they on whose hearts and their hearing and their eyes Allah has set a seal, and these are the heedless ones” (an-Nahl: 107-108).

The World: We saw that man is always in a world, and that Heidegger uses the expression being-in-the-world to indicate a fundamental characteristic of human existence, namely, man’s intercourse in the world with entities belonging to the world (Heidegger, 1962: 67). Being-in here means an existential relation, and is to be distinguished from the physical relation of being within the world, which characterizes the things with which man is concerned in the world. The world, in Heidegger’s view, is therefore not primarily an objective cosmos, the law of which are to be discovered by the intellectual activity of science, but a workshop which man, as being-in-the-world, constructs in his practical concern (Heidegger, 1962: 75). That is, in constructing the existential concept of the world, Heidegger returns to the pragmatic character of the entities within the world as they confront man in his concern. They are characterized as “zuhanden” rather than merely “vorhanden”. That is, entities are to hand, immediately present to our concern, rather than mere object for contemplation or observation. What is in the
world is of use to us, it is an instrument. As an instrument, everything has a reference to something else, and the totality of these references constitute the significance of the world. These references are brought into a unity in that they are all directed to one end—they are for the sake of Dasein (Macquarrie, 1973: 47). We conceive ‘world’ as a totality bound together by rationally comprehensible relationships of law into a unified structure containing heaven and earth and all living beings, including humans. It is apparent that world can mean ‘creation’. The term “creation” is the best example to show the affinity between Islamic and existential meanings of the world. “World” in general means all creatures. That is why God has called himself “Creator”. The term “Creation” means that the world is the work of God made by Him for man’s use and enjoyment. He considers it to be good. It means that the world is a garden for man to cultivate; it is a sphere over which man has been set. “Whoever desires the gain of the hereafter, we will give him more of that gain, and whoever desires the gain of this world, we give him of it, and in the hereafter he has no portion” (Al-Shūrā: 20). Or “And whoever is blind in this, he shall also be blind in the hereafter; and more erring from the way” (Al-'Eṣrā: 72).

But the world can also be conceived as hostile when it has fallen under the dominion of evil powers. That is, the world could be hostile not because it belongs to evil powers external to man, but because man himself has given it these possibilities of evilness. The real trouble is that man has worshiped and served the creature more than The Creator. Following the Qur’an teachings, “And seek by means of what Allah has given you the future abode, and do not neglect your portion of this world, and do good as Allah has done good to you, and do not seek to make mischief in the land, surely Allah does not love the mischief-maker” (Al-Qaṣāṣ: 77). The world can become a hostile destroying force if man has decided for it instead of for God. That is, if he founds his life upon it instead of upon God. “Those who love this world’s life more than the hereafter, and turn away from Allah’s path and desire to make it crooked; these are in great error” (Ebrāhīm: 3). Or “And leave those who have taken their religion for a play and an idle sport, and whom this world’s life has deceived, are remind (them) thereby lest a soul should be given up to destruction for what it has earned; it shall not have besides Allah any guardian nor an intercessor…” (Al-‘An’ām: 70).

Here we can put together the thought of the world as the creation of God and the thought of the world as a hostile power. It means that the conception of the world is related to the possibilities of human existence (Bultmann, 1951: 227). “… It was not Allah who should do them injustice, but they were unjust to themselves” (Al-Tawba: 70).

These verses that show man’s existence is always somatic (do not neglect your portion of this world” (Al-Qaṣāṣ: 77), and that he is confronted with the two basic possibilities of either being at one with himself or estranged from himself “He may be thankful or
unthankful” (Al-ʾEnsān: 3). clearly constitute an existential interpretation of the conception of world. This interpretation immediately invites comparison with Heidegger’s teaching that man is always being-in-the-world, and that his existence can be authentic or inauthentic.

If it can be shown that existential interpretation of the conception of the world throws light on any difficult verses of Qurʾan. This kind of interpretation enables us to make better sense of verses than other interpretations. For example there are some verses in Qurʾan in which it seems to speak of absence from the world as equivalent to presence with Allah “Whoever desires this world’s life and its finery, We will pay them in full their deeds therein, and they shall not be made to suffer loss in respect of them (16) These are they for whom there is nothing but fire in the hereafter, ...” (Hūd: 15-16). It seems that there is a paradoxical conception of world. Whereas Gnosticism attributed darkness, falsehood and the other negative concepts to the working of evil powers, and rest on an ultimate metaphysical dualism, in the verses of Qurʾan in which God is acknowledge as Creator of all things “Allah is the Creator of all things” (Al-Raʾd: 16). To solve, these verses should be interpreted in the light of some such concepts of existence as Heidegger’s existentialism described. That is the negative dimensions of world are possibility of decision. These contrasted concepts such as light and darkness, body and spirit, gain all their meaning from the question of human existence, and express the double possibility in man’s existing. That double possibility is to live from God, or to live from human resources- for man to be himself as the successive of God, or to lose himself in the world.

**Falleness:** Human existence has been exhibited as a possibility conditioned by factivity. But man flees from the disclosure to himself in anxiety of his ‘being-there’. On the one hand he identifies himself with the world and becomes absorbed in ‘worldly’ concerns; on the other hand he sheds his responsibility in the depersonalized collective way of being which we called the public. In his everyday talking he conceals from himself the challenge of his existence. These characteristics are brought together in Heidegger’s concept of falleness (Heidegger, 1962: 175).

Man’s falleness has a twofold aspect. It is first a fall into the world, out of which he tries to understand himself. He relates his possibilities exclusively to things, absorbs himself concerning them, and finds himself at home among them. Falleness is secondly a fall into collectivism, in which the individual surrenders his will to the depersonalized man and follows the crowd. This appears to be primarily the flight from possibility, so far as that means responsibility. As belonging to the public, the individual need not think or decide for himself, nor need he have any qualms of conscience, for what everyday does must be right. In the modern world with its vast technical apparatus and factory ‘hands’, these two aspects of falleness are, of
course, very closely combined (Macquarrie, 1973: 96).

Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of fallleness yields three important structures. The first is temptation. That is, man wants to surrender to the world. He tempts himself. He flees from himself and desire to fall into the world. The second structure is contentment. As fallen, man is delivered from the restlessness engendered by death. In his concern with things and his solidarity with the public, he is no longer disturbed by the ultimate issues of existence—unless, of course, his security is taken away from him for some reason or other, and then the mood of anxiety breaks into shatter this contentment. Finally there is the structure of alienation. As fallen, man is cut off from his true self and from his authentic possibilities (Macquarrie, 1973: 101). His contentment does not bring rest, for he must drive himself further into the world and so further from himself. It seems that there is a certain kinship between phenomenological understanding of fallleness and Islamic conception of the fall. It means that evil is a falling away of man from himself, a mistaken orientation of himself away from his authentic being. Based on Qur’an, too, fallleness has a twofold aspect. Firstly, fall into the word “Surely those who do not hope in our meeting and are pleased with this world’s life and are content with it, and those who are heedless of our communications: (8) Those, their abode is the fire because of what they earned (Yunus: 8.9). Or “Those who love this world’s life more than the hereafter, and turn away from Allah’s path and desire to make it crooked; these are in great error (Ibrahim: 3)”.

Secondly, fall into the collectivism, “And if you obey most of those in the earth, they will lead you astray from Allah’s way….. (Al-An’am: 116). That is at the same time sin and rebellion against God, who as creator gave man his being. “And be not like those who forsok Allah, so he made them forsake their own souls: this it is that are the transgressors (Al-Hashr: 19).” To attain or to lose his authentic being is equivalent on man’s part to recognizing God as his creator.

Authenticity is another important concept in Heidegger’s thought which entails the revelation of one’s own possibilities. In contrast to authenticity, Dasein displays a tendency to ‘fall’, to become absorbed in the concern of the They–self. As fallen, Dasein measures its worth or determines its value according to a standard of approval or disapproval upheld by the anonymous ‘crowd’. The “they-self” establishes its measure of worth according to external assessments, e.g. social position, power, prestige, etc. In contrast to the authentic self, the ‘they’ assesses worth by appealing to pregiven cultural preferences in reference to which all differences in viewpoints arise. As it may be seen, fall has the same meaning in the Islamic thought. “These are who buy the life of this world for the hereafter, so their chastisement shall not be lightened nor shall they be helped (Al-Baqara: 86).”

Existential treatment of the concept of “flesh” enables us to bring together manifestations of the life according to the
flesh such diverse human activities as the sensuality, and superficial legalism. They represent a falling away from God and a turning to the creature and the man-made. What appears to be original in this part is the way in which these different meanings for the flesh are brought together in the light of Heidegger’s concept of existence, and particularly the neutral meaning of flesh as the natural, and the bad meaning of flesh as the sinful. The distinction does not lie in anything outside man himself, in man’s existentiell decision for the creaturely rather than for the Creature. For example, the origin of the sin is not to matter or demonic agency, but to man himself “... And they did not do us any harm, but they did injustice to their own souls (Al-ʾAʿrāf: 160).”

Understanding: When we speak of understanding, we commonly think of an intellectual activity which leads to theoretical knowledge. To understand anything means to know its properties and behavior, and the most exact understanding is assumed to be of the kind which we call scientific. Against this excessive intellectualism, however, Heidegger and other existentialist thinkers protest. For Heidegger, “understanding always touches on the whole constitution of being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1962: 67). Now it is with this kind of understanding that theology is primarily concerned. In other words, the knowledge of nature is different from our knowledge of God. It means one’s ‘attitude’ in which thinking and willing are one (Bultmann, 1951: 214). It is not a set of propositions about God, as if God were an object to be viewed with academic detachment, but the knowledge which is implicit in our faith in God. “Successful indeed are the believers. Who are humble in their prayers, and who keep aloof from what is vain. And who are givers of poor-rate, and who guard their private parts ... (Al-Muʾminūn: 1-8).” We can no more speak intelligently about God without the experience of faith. “Surely those who believe and do Good their Lord will guide them by their faith ... (Yūnus: 9).” If we consider those verses of Qurʾān which explicitly speak of understanding or knowledge, we will find that they somehow confirm the existential meaning of understanding which has here been explained. “Do they not then reflect on the Qurʾān? Nay, on their hearts there are locks (Muhammad: 24).”

To understand, in both Islamic and existential thought, does not mean to explain rationally. We can understand, for example, what faithfulness means, and precisely by genuine understanding we know that the faithfulness which we personally enjoy is a mystery which we cannot but thankfully receive. For we perceive it neither by our rational thinking, nor by psychological, nor anthropological analysis, but only in open
readiness to personal encounter. In this readiness we can understand it in a certain way already before we are given it because our personal existence needs it. Then we understand it in searching for it, in asking for it (Bultmann, 1958: 15). “And those who believe and do Good, we will most surely cause them to enter among the good (Al-Ankabūt: 9).” That is why faith and practice are mentioned mostly together in the Qur’an.

Disclosure is another term in Heidegger’s hermeneutic which is related to understanding. This disclosure which is fundamental structure of existence, Heidegger identifies with the traditional doctrine of a “light of nature” (Heidegger, 1962: 133). This is fundamental understanding which makes possible all other understanding and knowledge. Ontologically this practical understanding is the “light of nature” which discloses to us our possibilities for good and evil, and makes possible our decision “And the soul and Him Who made it perfect (7)Then He inspired it to understand what is right and wrong for it (Al-Shams 7-8).” If understanding bears this particular existential sense in Qur’an, it justifies the expression of self-accusing in this verse “Nay! I swear by the self-accusing soul (Al-Qiyāmat: 2).”

Given another instance, Islam teaches human a new understanding of the self, that is Islamic life is a new understanding of the self. If understanding means primarily a theoretical activity, then to speak of a new understanding of the self would seem to be a very inadequate account of the Islamic life. But in the sense of understanding which has been explained, and which seems to be close to the Qur’anic meaning of term, a new understanding of the self means nothing less than a complete reorientation of the entire personality. “O, you who believe answer Allah and his messenger when he calls you to that which gives you life … (Al-Anfāl: 24).” or “Is he who was dead then we raised him to life and made for him a light by which he walks among the people …” (Al-An’ām: 122). The meanings of these verses are equivalent to a new life.

Anxiety: Heidegger believes that man is disclosed to himself in his being not only by his understanding but also by his affective state. All understanding is colored by some emotional mood, while every mood of the emotion has its own understanding (Heidegger, 1962: 134). He regards fear as an inauthentic mood. Fear always has as its object something within the world, and it belongs, therefore, to the inauthentic way of being in which man is absorbed in concern with the world and seeks his security there. An authentic existence, claims Heidegger, knows no fear, for it is not oriented to the world (Macquarrie, 1973: 65). “... Then whoever believes and acts aright, they shall have no fear, nor shall they grieve” (Al-An’ām: 48). It is worth noting here that the Qur’an also characterizes the life without God from which faith in God brings deliverance, that is, the life founded on the world, as a life of fear. In other words, according to Qur’an whoever believes God has no fear. “Surely they who believe and do good deeds and keep up prayer and pay the
poor-rate, they shall have their reward from their Lord and they shall have no fear, nor shall they grieve” (Al-Baqara: 277).

In his inauthentic way of being man loses himself in the world, and understands himself in terms of the world. This may be regarded as a kind of flight from himself as existing that is, standing apart from the world. It might be called a flight from the responsibilities of existence. It is from a consideration of this flight that Heidegger approaches the problem of the mood which above all discloses man in his being, and which he calls anxiety (Heidegger, 1962: 184). The object of fear, it will be recalled, is always something within the world. But the flight to which anxiety gives rise is not a flight from anything in the world-on the contrary it takes the form of a flight to precisely that which is within the world, that is, man allays his anxiety by losing himself in the world. Here the teaching of Heideggerian phenomenology appears to approach to that of the Qur’ān. “They shall say: Glory be to Thee; it was not beseeming for us that we should take any guardians besides Thee, but Thou didst make them and their fathers to enjoy until they forsook the reminder, and they were a people in perdition” (Al-Furqān: 18). Man’s being is such that he cannot find contentment in the world, and even when he is lulled into a false sense of security, a fundamental uneasiness, which we have called for want of a better expression the mood of anxiety, arises out of the very constitution of his being and breaks in to disclose to him that he is not at home, that the world is uncanny, and can be hostile when man surround himself to it. “... And the life of this world is nothing but a provision of vanities” (Al-ʾEmrān: 185). Or “Know that this world’s life is only sport and play and gaiety and boasting among yourselves, ...; and this world’s life is naught but means of deception” (Al-Hadid: 20).

Death: Heidegger is careful to point out explicidy that this does not prejudge the question whether man has another being after death. He believes that only when death is fully grasped in its ontological character, are we justified in asking what is after death (Heidegger, 1962: 247). Death as a natural phenomenon can be investigated by the normal methods of science. But death as an existential phenomenon must be investigated by the phenomenological method.

Heidegger clarifies this preliminary understanding of death as an existential phenomenon by referring it to his interpretation of the being of man as care. It should be mentioned that care had a threefold structure- possibility, facticity, and fallenness (Macquarrie, 1973: 112). Death belongs to man’s possibility- it is, indeed, his most intimate and isolated possibility, always his own. This possibility of death is not accidental or occasional. It belongs to man’s facticity. He is always already thrown into the possibility of death, as existing. His being, either he is always conscious of it or not is a “being-unto-death.” The possibility is therefore, on the one hand, certain- it is the one possibility of which we may be quite sure. Yet at the same time it is, on the other hand, always indefinite, because as
possibility it is already present. We are already thrown into it, and never know when it will be realized. This is the facticity of death. “Everyone on it [the earth] must pass away” (Al-Rahmān: 26). Fallenness is related to the flight from death. In his everyday inauthentic existence man avoids the thought of death, and conceals from himself its real significance. Since fallen man is concerned with the world and has founded his life on it, to go out of the world means for him the shattering of his existence, and he does not wish to think of it. “People die”-that much is recognized, but in this way death is depersonalized. The impersonal way of speaking serves to conceal the real issue which is “we die”, and that our death is disclosed to us as a present possibility. “Every soul shall taste of death, and you shall only be paid fully your reward on the resurrection day; then whoever is removed far away from the fire and is made to enter the garden he indeed has attained the object; and the life of this world is nothing but a provision of vanities” (Al-ʾEmrān: 185).

From the very introduction of Islamic philosophy, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle profoundly influenced Islamic theologians and shaped their anthropological and ethical conceptions. Therefore among muslims death was understood in the platonic sense, based on the tradition of thinking which goes back to Greek philosophy (Al-ʾJāberī, 2004: 15).

The Islamic eschatology agrees with the platonic thought in so far as each expects bliss after death and also in so far as bliss may be called freedom. This freedom is for Plato the freedom of the spirit from the body, the freedom of the spirit which can perceive the truth which is the reality of being (Plato, 1386: 584). But there is a difference between Islamic and Platonist notions of human nature. Plato conceives the realm of spirit as a realm without history because he conceives human nature as not subject to time and history (Bultmann, 1958: 9). The Islamic conception of the human being is that man is essentially a temporal being. This means that, human is an historical being who has a past which shapes his character and a future which always brings forth new encounters. “I swear by the time” (Al-ʾAsrār: 1).

Due to what has been mentioned, we should shift our analytical focus from death understood as an actuality to death understood as a possibility; only then can we intelligibly talk of death as something toward which any existing Dasein can stand in any kind of substantial, comprehensible relationship. In other words, we should reconceptualize our relation to our death not as something that is realized after we die, but rather something that we realize “in” our life. Hence, we can comport ourselves toward death only as a possibility; and further, it stands before us as a possibility throughout our existence. As Heidegger reminded us that death shows up only in and through life, in and through that which it threatens to render impossible, phenomenologically speaking, then, life is death’s representation (Mulhall.2005:305). In short, an authentic confrontation with death reminds human being to hold open the
possibility and impose the responsibility of living a life that is authentically individual and authentically whole, a life of integrity, authentic life. Heidegger points out that death does not refer to the fact that we will all die at some future point but instead to the fact that our lives are moving toward the realization of a form, and that each of us is responsible for the form his or her life ultimately has. Heidegger shifts away from common meaning of death to his own phenomenological meaning and identifies the world as medium which mediates tools and tasks as well as subject and predicates to each other with the result that sense occurs. That is, Dasein makes sense of itself and of others only by way of world (Heidegger, 1997: 280).

There is similarities between Heideggerian existentialism and Qur`an in facing death squarely as an issue touching our individual existence, and in the condemnation of man’s tendency to conceal from himself the ever present possibility of his death. “Say : flight shall not do you any good if you fly from death or slaughter, and in that case you will not be allowed to enjoy yourselves but a little” (Al-ʾAhzāb: 16).

Heidegger believes that instead of fleeing from death, man is to look death in the face, and more than that, he is to accept it as his own pre-eminent possibility (Heidegger, 1962: 266). Admittedly such an acceptance will deliver us from concern with the world and from the tyranny of the public.

3. Conclusion
A theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic needs, the statement of the truth of religious message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation. Theology moves back and forth between these two poles. Not many theological systems have been able to balance these two demands perfectly. Most of them either sacrifice elements of the truth or are not able to speak to the situation (Tillich, 1960: 3).

It would hardly be unfair to say that much of the liberal modernism which prevailed at the beginning of the previous century had the demerit of combining both the shortcomings to which Tillich refers (Macquarie, 1973: 219). On one hand it had sacrificed elements of the truth in attempting to combine and harmonize the religious teaching with the philosophical and scientific thought of the day. On the other hand, it did not speak to man’s real situation since it was infected with the optimistic view of man which then prevailed in secular thought.

Studying religion based on Heideggerian philosophy and its phenomenological method will help us to hold balance between the truth of religion and human situation. It will be shown in this approach to religion, how the life of faith, which is, on the one hand, the gift of God, is on the other hand, related to the possibilities of man’s being.

Theology must understand the situation in which the “word of God” is expressed. Such understanding is not strictly theology but a pre-theology or ontological understanding which can alone secure the ground on which the theological structure proper is to be
raised. This paper claims that due to affinity between existentialism and Islam, philosophy of existence is an appropriate pre-theology which can enrich our religious understanding. The Islamic life into which the Qur’an summons us could be shown as an ‘existentiell’ possibility lying within the horizons of man’s existential possibilities. In fact philosophy of existence is not a speculative metaphysic but phenomenology of self-analysis. It is not a speculative metaphysic detached from man, but man himself, as he understands himself. In other words, the theological exposition of the Qur’an must take note of man’s understanding of himself in general, if the new understanding given in faith is to be shown as a real possibility for man.

Here may be some doubt about Heideggerian approach to religion, since there is no mention of God in his existential analytic. To this objection, it may be replied that Heidegger began his philosophizing with the study of medieval thought, and that his works are interspersed with references to religious conceptions such as fallenness, care, guilt, and death, and its quest for an authentic existence is nothing other than a partial rediscovery of some aspects at least of the religious understanding of man. That is, so far as man is fallen away from his true self, he is fallen away from the being which the creator has given him. He is therefore denying God and rebelling against God. Alienation from God follows from alienation from the authentic self.

On the other hand, Heidegger believes that any attempt to construe his philosophy along the lines of a philosophical anthropology was bound to fail. The analysis of existence as developed in “Being and Time” was precisely not intended as an investigation of the human being. But this meant that his philosophical task was primarily ontological and it was not primarily concerned with an investigation of the human being (Gordon, 2010: 177).

At the end we come to this conclusion that based on the affinity between Heidegger’s existentialism and Islamic conception of human being, it is possible to apply his phenomenology to Islamic studies. The consequences of such an application can enrich our understanding of human being, for example the authentic stance toward life makes us face up to the fact that to the extent we are building our own lives in all we do, we are “answerable” for the choices we make. Heidegger’s account of human existence points to a way of understanding why substantive moral reflection must play a crucial role in our self-understanding. Heidegger’s existentialism involves a clear-sighted recognition that human reality at the deepest level consists not of self-encapsulated individuals in unavoidable conflict, but of a “we” or “co-Dasein” already attuned in the shared quest for goods definitive of a community- such goods, for
us, as fairness, honesty, dignity, benevolence, achievement, and so on.

References


کاربرد پدیدارشناسی هایدگر در این مطالعه از اسلام

غریبرز محرم خانی

تاریخ پذیرش: ۹۴/۱۱/۱۲
تاریخ دریافت: ۹۳/۱۲/۲۴

بدهی است که تفسیر هر منظوری بر اساس مفاهیم که درستی از مفروضات انسانیان شود، صورت می‌گیرد.

به‌طور دخالت این مفاهیم در فهم منون اغلب به شکل ناخودگاههای است. سوال مهمی که پیش می‌آید این است که مفاهیم مناسب برای تفسیر منظور کدام یک می‌باشد؟

هایدگر با روش پدیدار شناسی اش در صدد بود بچ جای سوال از "وجود" معنای "وجود" را کشف نماید. برای مثال، به این هدف او انسان را برگزید. چرا که معین نمود که انسان نشان هست هویت و زمان "را به مطالعه انسان اختصاص داده و به‌طور دیگر قرار بدهد منظور انسان و مطلبی به زندگی انسان است.

دلیل مشاهده میان این دو منظور این مقاله در صدد پرسری این است که این مقاله با استفاده از مفاهیم پدیدار شناسی هایدگر در تفسیر قرآن خصوصاً جهان انسانی بهره‌گرفته‌ای منظور یافته‌انی با پاسخ این سوال مشابه‌های برخی از مفاهیم اصلی در پدیدار شناسی هایدگر و قرار می‌گیرد. گرفته‌نشده و این پرسری نشان می‌دهد که این اشارات قرار دارد که با تکیه بر این می‌توان از پدیدار شناسی هایدگر در فهم قرآن استفاده نمود. مثلاً این که پدیدار شناسی هایدگر به ما کمک خواهد کرد تا برا سوالات امروزه انسان مسلمان پاسخ مناسبی تهیه نمود.

واژگان کلیدی: هایدگر، پدیدار شناسی، اسلام، انسان

۱. استادیار. گروه علوم سیاسی دانشگاه علوم اجتماعی، دانشگاه پیام نور